
NOMURA

Japan at the Crossroads of Economic Revival and the Role of Nomura Group

Junichi Ujiie Chairman

Nomura Holdings, Inc. May 29, 2003


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Today, I will talk about Japan at the crossroads of economic revival and the role of Nomura Group.

I Japan at the Crossroads of Economic Revival > Action by the Government > Acceleration of Corporate Restructuring > Shift of Individual Financial Assets

I will discuss Japan at the crossroads of economic revival covering three topics: action by government, acceleration of corporate restructuring, and the shift of individual financial assets.



Let me start with action by government.


economic problems.

For a while now, the Japanese economy has been in a downturn, and recently the fall in share prices has stood out. At present we cannot see many bright prospects from the macro-economic statistics available to us. However, we are now beginning to see signs of economic revival in industry and at the company level. Before going into those details, I would like to point out that the


Government is now trying to take action to tackle various

For example, in addition to the Program for Financial Revival, which started last September, the Government has formulated another plan for corporate revival. In order to carry out the plan, the government set up the Industrial Revitalization Corporation this April.


The government's idea of integrating plans for financial revival and corporate revival is a step forward in the right direction.



As I mentioned, changes have been taking place at the company level. This graph shows the number of M&A transactions among Japanese corporations. In global terms, the number of M&A transactions has continued to lag, but Japan is an exception. As for the type of transactions, the majority is aimed at group restructuring and strengthening existing business.




The traditional structure of cross shareholdings is being unwound. The cross shareholdings ratio fell from 33% in fiscal year 1990 to 17% in fiscal year 2001, as the red line shows. On the other hand, the foreign institutional investors' shareholding ratio rose to 18% in 2001. By unwinding cross-shareholding positions, corporate management will become more aware of pressure from shareholders.




This graph shows the trend of equity issuance and share buybacks among Japanese corporations. The total amount of share buybacks implemented in fiscal year 2002 was 2.7 trillion yen, a year-on-year increase of nearly 70%. Recently, share buybacks have overtaken equity finance in terms of volume.


These buybacks are carried out partly to unwind cross shareholdings.




Cost restructuring is also gathering pace. This graph shows the transition of nominal wages in Japan, which peaked in 1998 and have fallen 4.5% since. This points to how Japanese companies have altered their traditional seniority-based remuneration systems and begun restructuring.




This graph looks at rehabilitation-type bankruptcy procedures, such as corporate rehabilitation represented by the green bars, and recently introduced civil reorganization procedures shown by the red bars. The Civil Reorganization Law enacted in April 2000 has similar provisions to Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Act and, as you can see from the red bars, has brought about a rapid increase to the figures. We can see that this law has boosted movements to reorganize companies through reconstructive procedures rather than act as a catalyst to wipe out companies via bankruptcy or liquidation-type measures.




Japanese companies are also improving the state of their balance sheets. This graph shows the debt/equity ratio and ROE using the Nomura 400 index excluding financials. We can clearly see the effect of compressing balance sheets and reducing interest-bearing debt since the bursting of the economic bubble. Since 1980, the debt/equity ratio has fallen from 200% to 122%. Furthermore, owing to restructuring measures, ROE is expected to reach 7.3% in 2003, which is almost the same level as in 1990 when the stock price was at an historically high level.




It is well known that Japanese individual financial assets are concentrated in low-risk financial products like cash and deposits. This situation has not changed that much for the last few years. If you look at the statistics for 2002, the percentage of individual financial assets invested in securities products was 48% in the US, but only 10% in Japan.



However, this makes sense if you consider that these deposits are partly in postal savings accounts, which are backed by the government, and bank deposits, which have been protected under the government policy of guaranteeing all deposits regardless of the limit of the deposit insurance. In fact, there was a sudden shift of assets to demand deposits in April 2002 when the government guarantee on term deposits was lifted. Therefore, one cannot say individual investors in Japan are not sensitive to risk-return profiles.




This graph illustrates investment in foreign assets by individuals. From last year this figure increased 45% to 16 trillion yen, still a little more than 1% of total individual financial assets. At the same time, however, the dollar has not necessarily risen against Japanese yen, as the red line shows. It is thought this represents an increase in the number of individuals seeking returns, for example in the form of coupon payments, even if they have to take exchange rate risks amid continuing ultra low interest rates in Japan.




Tax reforms aim to encourage a shift of assets. From January this year, capital gains tax and dividend tax have been simplified and reduced to 10%. Though this incentive will last for the next five years only, securities taxes look favorable when compared to the 20% tax on deposit interest.

To sum up so far, I would say that although Japan is not yet seeing clear changes at the macro level, such signs are emerging at the micro level in the corporate sectors and among individual investors.



Let us now move to the topic regarding Nomura's role in Japan's revival.




As you can see from this slide, we aim to contribute to Japan's revival by supporting the flow of money between companies progressing with restructuring and individual investors. Our strategy towards this end is to promote corporate restructuring by providing solutions via capital markets and encourage the shift of individual financial assets from cash and deposits into higher risk-return products by supplying diverse products.




Our strategy for the corporate sector is to encourage acceleration of restructuring. On the corporate revival front, we acted as financial advisor for troubled companies such as Niigata Engineering and First Credit, and invested our own capital in Misawa Resort and other companies through our subsidiary named Nomura Principal Finance.

In M&A advisory, we are active not only in intra-Japan deals but also crossborder deals, such as Wal-Mart =Seiyu and Publicis/Bcom3=Dentsu. Last year, Nomura was ranked number one in announced M&A with any Japanese involvement.




On the initial public offering and public offering front, we executed Daido Life's IPO, the first demutualization of a life insurance company in Japan. We also acted as global coordinator for East Japan Railway and Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group. As a result, we had an IPO share of 49% and PO share of 44% for the year ended March 2003.

Securitization, which has been expanding quickly in Japan, is important in the sense that it integrates bank loans and capital markets. We have acted as lead manager for securitization of loans, such as for Shinsei Bank, and the securitization of foundation funds, such as for Nippon Life.




As shown before, the majority of individual financial assets are held in cash and deposits in Japan. Our strategy is to provide various financial products to encourage diversification of these assets and lead them to capital markets.

This graph shows the distribution volume of foreign currency denominated bonds for Japanese retail investors. We are supporting currency diversification of individual financial assets by supplying products that match the needs of foreign issuers with high credit ratings that are interested in these vast assets. Such issuers include the European Investment Bank, Federal Loan Home Mortgage Corporation and Inter-American Development Bank.




The graph on the left shows the transition of stock holding accounts opened at our Japanese branch offices. As of the end of March 2003, we had 1.3 million accounts, an increase of about 270,000 accounts since the end of March 2000 as a result of our efforts to broaden the individual investor base.

The graph on the right shows the outstanding value of variable annuity insurance contracts, a new product for Japanese retail investors. We started offering this product in October 2001. As of the end of March 2003, the outstanding amount was 167 billion yen.



For our investment trust business, products are primarily supplied by a subsidiary called Nomura Asset Management. It has the top share in the public investment trusts market at 30%. It also has the top shares in the bond- and equity-type investment trusts markets.



From the graph, you can see a clear change in revenue structure of our company for the last four years, demonstrating how we are proceeding with product diversification. We aim to contribute to asset diversification of individual investors through this effort.



In conclusion, as commercial and industrial bank systems in Japan have problems with their business models, for instance, low returns, non-performing loans, and cross shareholdings, Nomura's role for Japan's revival is crucially important for both corporate restructuring and the flow of risk money to industries.